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It is commonly accepted that student evaluation of teaching (SET) ratings are
inﬂuenced by expected grades,and that faculty are able to ‘buy’higher SET ratings
by giving higher grades.Researchers have questioned whether there are limits to
the ability to buy grades due to the possibility that students reward teachers for
their relative grade as opposed to their absolute grade.
In this paper we use SET data to investigate the relationship between SET ratings and
relative grades.Similar to the prior literature,we ﬁnd an indirect relationship between
SET scores and historical grade performance averages (GPAs) but,we ﬁnd the
opposite result to be true when we examine the relationship between SET scores and
expected grades earned by peers.Contrary to recent literature that suggests limits
exist to an instructor’s ability to purchase high SET scores when relative grades are
considered,we ﬁnd that the incentives to lower grading standards and buy higher
SET ratings may actually be greater than has been thought in the past.
Introduction
Economists and sociologists have long recognised that satisfaction may depend on
one’s own circumstances or one’s circumstances relative to a reference group
(Becker,1974).Indeed,a host of economists have explored the notion that
satisfaction with one’s own level of consumption and saving is often referenced by
that of one’s neighbours (Veblen,1899;Duesenberry,1949).More recently,Luttmer
(2005) presented a set of convincing data that self-reported satisfaction may come
from one’s relative income position rather than one’s absolute income position.He
found that the inverse relationship between satisfaction and peer income becomes
more signiﬁcant as the peer group becomes more similar to the respondent.TheThe Impact of Relative Grade Expectations on Student Evaluation of Teaching
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study on the relationship between happiness and relative income position is not a
new undertaking,and although recent studies,such as the ones conducted by
Luttmer (2005) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) identify an inverse relation between
happiness and peer income,Diener et al.(1995) and Inglehart (1990) suggest the
opposite may be true:that individuals have greater happiness when they are
surrounded by wealthier individuals.
This paper investigates the possibility that a similar phenomenon holds true for
student satisfaction with teaching.We investigate whether an individual’s evaluation
of his or her instructor is inﬂuenced by peer performance,and we examine which of
the many deﬁnitions of peer performance is most inﬂuential in the student’s
evaluation.Although overwhelming evidence suggests that a student’s evaluation
of his or her instructor is related to their expected grade,we ask whether it is the
relative or absolute grade that matters,or if both are important.
Two papers have recently addressed this issue.Isley and Singh (2005) and
McPherson (2006) ﬁnd some evidence that student satisfaction is inversely related
to the student’s own prior grade history,but we are unaware of any attempt to
decipher the relationship between student satisfaction with teaching and the
student’s expected grade relative to the grades of their peers.If student satisfaction
is relative,a student’s evaluation of teaching may decline as peer group
performance increases relative to one’s own grade.Alternatively,students may
conclude that increases in peer performance are the result of better teaching,and
thus reward teachers by giving them higher evaluations.
We conclude that student satisfaction with instruction depends not only on one’s
own experience in the classroom,but on the experiences of one’s peers.We show that
student satisfaction is related to both one’s own expected grade and the grades of
others around them.We investigate different measures of how the reference group
may be determined,and conclude that individual students reward teachers with
higher evaluations as both their own grade and the grades of their peers increase.
Background
Researchers have examined how instructor grades inﬂuence student evaluations of
teaching (SET) for almost 75 years.Mason et al.(1995) noted that by the year 1990,
over 1,300 articles had been published trying to explain how students evaluate
faculty.This vast quantity of research reﬂects the fact that,despite wide criticism
regarding the reliability of such instruments,student evaluations play an important
role in the tenure and promotion process at most US colleges and universities.The
instruments used for the evaluation of faculty are typically completed by students
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at the end of the semester,and require students to rate their instructors on a Likert
scale indicating the perceived quality of instruction.
One of the most intriguing items in this literature is the relationship between
expected student grades and SET ratings.Krautmann and Sander (1999) conclude
(p.61) that ‘faculty have the ability to “buy”’higher [teaching] evaluations by
lowering their grading standards.’By lowering grading standards,and making it less
difficult for students to earn high grades,faculty can prompt students to respond
with higher SET ratings.McPherson (2006,p.18) comes to a similar conclusion when
he claims that ‘higher expected grades do lead to signiﬁcantly better SET scores
among both principles and upper division [economics] classes.’
A caveat to this ﬁnding was brought forth by Isley and Singh (2005) who found an
inverse relationship between SET scores and historical grade point averages.They
suggest that it is a student’s expected grade relative to their customary grade that
is the best predictor of SET ratings.Although all three of these papers provide
interesting insights to the student evaluation process,these studies are based on
class level data and,as a result,are not able to provide a robust test of how
individual relative grade expectations may inﬂuence SET ratings.
Knowing whether relative grade expectations impact SET ratings is important
because if students reward teachers for high relative grades as opposed to simply
high absolute grades there may be limits to an instructor’s ability to ‘purchase’
better teaching evaluations by increasing the grades of all students.Conversely,if
individual students reward teachers for their own high grades as well as the high
grades of their peers,it becomes expensive to give low grades to anyone in class
and increases the incentive to ‘buy’higher SET ratings.To be sure,the incentive
depends on (a) how relative grade expectations are formed,and (b) who individual
students consider as their peers.In this paper we choose to focus on how
alternative measures of relative grades inﬂuences SET ratings.
We posit three different ways that students may identify relative peer groups and
discuss the implications for SET ratings in each case.First,satisfaction with one’s
own grade may be referenced by a ﬁxed point such as one’s own historical GPA.
When a student receives a grade higher than their ﬁxed reference point they are
relatively pleased with their instructor,and when a student earns a grade lower
than their ﬁxed reference point they are relatively disappointed and are less
satisﬁed with their instructor.In this case,grades received by peers are not relevant,
and the student’s only reference point is his or her own historical performance.As
such,if higher relative grades lead to higher student evaluations,it is possible for
teachers to ‘buy’higher evaluations simply by giving higher grades.This is the form
of relative performance investigated by Isley and Singh (2005) when they used
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expected average class grade relative to average class cumulative GPA to help
explain SET ratings.Although their study provides critical insight as to the
importance of relative grade expectations on SET scores,their approach cannot
answer questions regarding the impact of peer performance on SET ratings.
Second,satisfaction with one’s own grade may be referenced by an aggregate
measure of peer performance such as the average grade earned by all students
who take the same course,or by the average grade given by the instructor during
past semesters.Student satisfaction may be positively or negatively related to the
grades earned by their peer group.If students are only concerned about their
relative position in grading,they may penalise teachers for giving higher grades to
their peers.Alternatively,students may interpret high grades among their peers as a
sign of good teaching,and prompt them to further reward their teacher with high
evaluations.
Third,students may use a reference point such as the perceived average grade in
the individual class in which they are enrolled.Comparing one’s own performance
to the average class performance appears to be the norm.We have observed that
most teachers,when they hand back a test,report the average or median class
grade.Students often seem to take some relief in the fact that they have done
better than average even if their performance is not absolutely satisfactory.
Students also seem to believe that something has gone amiss when the average
score reported by their teacher is lower than what they consider ‘normal.’This
suggests that students may react either positively or negatively to increases in the
grades of their peers.Therefore,it seems reasonable to assume that students
consider both their relative grade as well as the overall performance of the class.
In this third case,the students’subjective reference point is not ﬁxed,but rather is
determined by the grades given in the class of which they are part.As an instructor
increases individual grades he or she also raises the average class grade.The
increase in the average grade likely has two opposite effects:it lowers the relative
satisfaction of all students in class,but increases the perceived ability of the teacher.
Increases in peer performance may increase or decrease SET ratings.
Econometric model 
It is common to posit that a student’s evaluation of his or her teacher depends on
class characteristics,the student’s demographic characteristics,instructor
characteristics,and the grade earned in the class by the student.Based on this
formulation we could model the satisfaction of student i in class j as Sij =F(C,T,D,G),
where Sij represents the level of satisfaction of the student i in class j,C represents a
vector of class characteristics,T represents a vector of instructor behaviours,D
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represents student demographic characteristics and effort,and G represents the
student’s expected grade in the class.
We propose an alternative model of student satisfaction that recognises that a
student’s level of satisfaction with his or her instructor may depend on the
student’s relative grade in the class as well as his or her absolute grade.Let G
represent a measure of the perceived performance of a reference group.Now we
may modify the above model by writing Sij = F(C,T,D,G,G /G).
Note that if satisfaction is linear in perceived relative grade and independent of the
other arguments in the satisfaction function,then G/G,this will not alter the
average level of satisfaction with instruction in aggregate.This points out why
using class level data to test whether relative grade perceptions inﬂuence student
evaluations may be fruitless.If students base their relative performance on the
performance of the class on average,this variable may not appear to inﬂuence SET
ratings when class level data is used.
In order to test the inﬂuence of relative expected grades on SET ratings we use ﬁve
different models,representing the different ways relative performance is
considered.In each case we correct for the sample selection identiﬁed by Becker
and Powers (2001) and insure that expected grades are truly exogenous using a
Hausman speciﬁcation test.
Survey and data
During the last week of the fall semester 2003 we asked students at a large public
university in the US for information about the grade they expected to receive in a
class.The survey was conducted in 32 separate courses,representing every class
offered by the economics department during the semester.It was given
immediately after the students completed instructor/course evaluations,and
students were told the survey was voluntary and were assured their responses
would remain anonymous.Even though we asked students to provide their student
identiﬁcation number (which clearly meant that,in spite of the prior mentioned
assurances to the contrary,the anonymity of their written evaluations could be
compromised),response rates for those present in the classrooms at the time of the
survey were greater than 95 per cent.A few students declined to ﬁll out the
questionnaire,but less than 3 per cent of the students who actually ﬁlled out the
questionnaire omitted their student identiﬁcation number.Thus,of a potential
enrolled student population of 1,016 in the courses surveyed,we have complete
data on 716 students.This 70 per cent response rate suggests an absenteeism rate
of about 25 per cent on the day(s) of the survey.
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The instructor evaluation form asked students about ﬁve dimensions of instructor
quality:organisation,willingness to respond to students,availability,respect for
students,and overall contribution of the instructor.Students ranked their
instructors on a scale of 1(low) to 7 (high) in each category.Similar to McPherson
(2006) we used the average of the ﬁve responses (SET) as the measure of student
satisfaction with their instructor.1We did estimate the models using only the
responses to the question regarding the overall contribution of the instructor (with
ordered probit),but found no substantial differences with averaging the SET
ratings.After obtaining student responses,we surveyed faculty about the different
grading practices used during the semester and obtained actual grades assigned to
each student at the end of the semester.
Similar to Mason et al.(1995),we categorised our explanatory variables as teacher-
related,class-related or student-related.Because our unit of observation was the
individual,we were able to use more detailed information than if we had used class
level data.Because we were interested in the inﬂuence of expected grade and
expected grade relative to a peer group,we also included measures of these two
variables.The data we used to estimate our model are given in Table 1.
We considered whether the instructor was part-time (ADJUNCT = 1) or full-time
(ADJUNCT = 0),and we included a variable indicating the percentage of the
student’s grade that was based on testing (TESTP).We considered four class
characteristics.We included a variable indicating whether the class was a lower
division,introductory class,(LOWER = 1) or a more advanced,upper division class
(LOWER = 0).We controlled for class size (SIZE) and for the number of times the class
met each week (MEET).At the university where the study was conducted classes
meet once,twice or three times per week.All classes that meet once per week are
evening classes,so this variable reﬂects this fact.Because the classes surveyed
include both economics courses and courses in quantitative analysis we included a
variable indicating if the class is in economics (ECON = 1) or in quantitative analysis
(ECON = 0).Finally,we include the demographic variables reﬂecting the student’s
age (AGE) and whether or not the student was male (MALE = 1) or female (MALE =
0).We also controlled for the student’s self-reported level of effort in the class
(EFFORT).Students reported a level of effort from 1 (low) to 7 (high).
Because our question of interest is how SET ratings are inﬂuenced by expected
grades and expected grade relative to peer performance,we include variables for
each student’s expected grade (EXGRADE) and their expected grade relative to that
of a reference point.We calculated three different measures of reference points
based on the deﬁnition of peer performance and one reference point based on the
student’s own historical performance.We calculated the ratio of the student’s
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expected grade to the average expected grade of students in the course section
(AVESECTION),the average expected grade given in all sections of the course
(AVECOURSE),and the average grade given by the instructor in all classes he or she
teaches (AVEINST).We also include a measure of relative performance based on the
student’s past grade history (GPA).If one’s satisfaction with instruction is more
Table 1:Means and standard deviations
Variable Mean Standard deviation
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highly correlated with peer performance as the peer group becomes more closely
related to one’s self,we expect peer reference groups of the individual class
(AVESECTION) to be more inﬂuential than the peer performance of all students
taking the same subject (AVECOURSE) or the peer performance in classes taught by
the same instructor (AVEINST).
It is worthwhile to note that students only have subjective estimates of peer
performance.These estimates of peer performance are based on historical faculty
reputations,informal discussion between students regarding mid-term
examination scores,and publicly available SET evaluation scores.With certainty,
student networks exist that provide information on which classes and instructors
are most difficult,which instructors should be avoided,and which instructors
should be sought after based on grading practices.
Estimation
Prior to estimating the determinants of SET rankings we turn to two econometric
issues:endogeniety and sample selection.Endogeniety is of concern because of the
inclusion of expected grade as a right-hand side variable.Higher student
evaluations may result from better teaching,but we have no data on ‘better
teaching’to include in our estimation.Since higher grades may also be partly the
result of ‘better teaching’this variable may be correlated with the error term.
Evidence on the endogeniety between SET ratings and expected grades is mixed.
Krautman and Sander (1999),Isley and Singh (2005) and McPherson (2006) ﬁnd no
evidence of endogeniety,whereas Nelson and Lynch (1984) suggest endogeniety in
expected grade may be a problem.We used the regression test suggested by
Woolridge (2006,p.532) and found endogeniety not to be an issue in our data set.2
The second econometric issue we confronted was sample selection.Because surveys
were conducted at the end of the semester,the sample may be a good reﬂection of
the end of term enrolment,but is unlikely to provide an accurate reﬂection of all
students enrolled.In addition,students not in attendance on the day the sample was
conducted might be signiﬁcantly different from those in attendance and completing
the survey.Using class level data,this sample selection is generally addressed by
including class sizes as an explanatory variable:however,because we have individual
data we estimate a sample selection model described by Heckman (1979).
Using data from all students who received grades in the class we estimated a
sample selection equation predicting whether or not the student was present in
class on the day evaluations were administered (COMPLETE = 1 if survey was
completed and 0 otherwise).We estimated COMPLETE using the actual grade
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students received in class (GRADE),whether the class was taught by a part-time
instructor (ADJUNCT),and whether the class was offered at the introductory level
(LOWER).We controlled for class size (SIZE),and the number of times the class met
each week (MEET).In addition we accounted for whether the class was in
economics (ECON),the student’s age (AGE) and the student’s gender (MALE).In this
equation we used actual grade rather than expected grade,because we were able
to obtain actual grades for all students,regardless of whether they were present on
the day the survey was given.Using a probit regression we estimated the equation
COMPLETE = β0 + β1ADJUNCT + β2LOWER + β3SIZE + β4MEET +β5ECON + β6AGE +
β7MALE + β8GRADE + E,and saved λ,the inverse Mills ratio to correct for sample
selection when estimating SET rankings.
Estimated results from the selection equation are presented in Table 2.Students
who earned higher grades were more likely to be present in class on the day of the
evaluations and complete the SET form,as were students enrolled in economics
classes.Students in lower division classes were less likely to be present on the day
teacher evaluations were conducted.
We estimated the ﬁve different models below to predict SET ratings and present
the results for each model in Table 3.3
Table 2:Regression results:sample selection equation










n = 1016 Unrestricted LLF = –560.2 P-Value=.001
Restricted LLF = –617.4
** = signiﬁcant at the .05 level in a two-tailed t-test
* = signiﬁcant at the .10 level in a two-tailed t-test
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SETi= a + Σ Bi Ci +Σα jTi + Σθ i Di + γ1 Gi + δ1λ + Ei (1) 
SETi= a + Σ Bi Ci + Σαi Ti + Σθi Di + γ1 Gi + γ2/GPA + δ1λ + Ei (2) 
SETi= a + Σ Bi Ci + ΣαiTi + Σθi Di + γ1 Gi + γ2 Gi/AVSECTION + δ1λ + Ei (3) 
SETi= a + Σ Bi Ci + ΣαiTi + Σθi Di + γ1 Gi + γ2 Gi/AVCOURSE + δ1λ + Ei (4)
SETi= a + Σ Bi Ci + ΣαiTi + Σθi Di + γ1 Gi + γ2 Gi/AVINST + δ1λ + Ei (5)
In each of the equations,Ci represents class characteristics,Ti represents teacher
characteristics,Di represents student demographics and effort,Gi represents the
students expected grade,and λ represents the inverse Mills ratio from the sample
selection equation.The four different reference grades are Gi/GPA,Gi/AVSECTION,
Gi/AVCOURSE,and Gi/AVINST.4
Results
Our ﬁndings are generally consistent with existing research,and are presented in
Tables 3 and 4.Part-time faculty receive lower evaluations than do full-time faculty.
Class size and instructor SET rating are inversely related.Instructors in economics
classes tend to have higher SET ratings than instructors in quantitative analysis
classes.We ﬁnd that older students tend to give higher SET ratings and that students
who put forth more effort in class also give higher SET ratings.Consistent with past
research we ﬁnd higher expected grades are correlated with higher SET ratings.
Estimation of equation (2) conﬁrms the ﬁndings of both Isley and Singh (2005) and
McPherson (2006),who noted that as a student’s expected grade increases relative
to their historical GPA,they further reward their instructors with a higher SET ratings.
As shown in Table 3,the estimated coefficient on λ,the inverse Mills ratio,was not
signiﬁcant in any of the regression equations,indicating that sample selection is
likely not an issue.Apparently,the students who were absent on the day
evaluations were conducted were not signiﬁcantly different from those who were
present.Because of this we present ordinary least squares estimates in Table 4.The
OLS estimates,and the estimates corrected for sample selectivity are similar,and we
will focus our discussion on the OLS results due to the insigniﬁcance of λ in the
sample selection equation.
Results presented in Table 4 indicate that peer performance does have signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on individual SET rankings in equations (3) and (5).Based on a likelihood
ratio test comparing the log likelihood function in equation (1),which does not
include a relative measure of expected grade,with the log likelihood functions of
equation (3),which includes the explanatory variable (expected grade/average
course section grade),or equation (5) which includes the explanatory variable
(expected grade/average instructor grade) we reject the null hypothesis that
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adding this new variable does not improve the predictive power of the model with
a p-value of less than 5 per cent.We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant beneﬁt to adding the
variable (expected grade/GPA) in equation (2) or expected grade/average course
grade) in equation (4).These results shed some light as to how the performance of
peers impacts SET ratings.
The inﬂuence of expected grade and reference grade on SET ratings are given by
∂SET/ ∂EXGRADE = γ1 + γ2 /(Reference Grade) and ∂SET/ ∂(Reference Grade) = -
γ2[EXGRADE/(Reference Grade)2].In equation (2),where the reference grade is
historical GPA,estimated values for γ1 and γ2 are both positive.Therefore,∂SET/
∂EXGRADE is positive,and ∂SET/ ∂(Reference Grade) is negative,indicating that for
the sample,as expected grade increases SET rankings increase,and as the historical
GPA increases,SET ranking declines.
In equation (3),where the reference grade is the average grade received in the
individual course section,and in equation (5),where the reference grade is the
average grade given by the instructor,we ﬁnd γ1 to be signiﬁcantly greater than
zero,and γ2 to be signiﬁcantly less than zero.Therefore,∂SET/ ∂EXGRADE may be
positive or negative,and ∂SET/ ∂(Reference Grade) is always positive.In these two
cases it is possible that ∂SET/ ∂EXGRADE is negative,but only if |γ1 | < |γ2
/(Reference Grade)|,which is not the case for our data.
The most striking aspect of our results is how different reference grades impact SET
ratings.When a student’s reference point is their own historical GPA,increases in
their own expected grade have an unambiguously positive impact on their SET
ratings.When the reference point is the expected grades of their peers in the same
course section,or the grades of students who have taken the same instructor,
increases in one’s own expected grade may have a positive or negative impact on
SET ratings,and increases in the reference grade have an unambiguously positive
impact on their SET ratings.
Students positively reward the instructor for their own high grade,but this increase
in the SET ranking is moderated by the fact that other students in class are not
similarly rewarded.It is clear that peer group performance plays a signiﬁcant role in
how students evaluate their instructors,and it is clear that the deﬁnition of peer
group matters.The peer groups that appear to have the largest inﬂuence on a
student’s SET rating are the students closest to the student,either sitting in the
same class,or peers who have taken the same instructor.
Conclusion
It is commonly accepted that SET rankings are inﬂuenced by the expected grades,
and that faculty are able to ‘buy’higher SET ratings by giving higher grades.
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Recently however researchers have questioned whether there are limits to the
ability to buy grades due to the possibility that students reward teachers for their
relative grade as opposed to their absolute grade.Some evidence exists that this
may be the case.Using class level data researchers have identiﬁed an indirect
relationship between average SET scores and average historical GPAs.
In this paper we use individual SET data to investigate the relationship between SET
ratings and relative grades.Similar to the prior literature,we ﬁnd an indirect
relationship between SET scores and historical GPAs in our sample,but we ﬁnd the
opposite result to be true when we examine the relationship between SET scores
and expected grade relative to average score given in the individual class and
relative to the average grade given by the instructor.We have strong evidence that
students reward instructors based on their own high grades,but also on the grades
received by their peers.We ﬁnd the most inﬂuential peer group to be those
students sitting in the same class or the students taking the same instructor rather
than the students enrolled in the same subject.Contrary to recent literature that
suggests limits exist to an instructor’s ability to purchase high SET scores when
relative grades are considered,we ﬁnd that the incentives to lower grading
standards students and buy higher SET ratings may actually be greater than has
been thought in the past.
Notes
1  By using the average SET rating across six categories we severely restrict the number
of cases where SET equals either one or seven.In total,29 of the 715 observations
have an average SET value equal to either one or seven.
2 In order to conduct the endogeniety test we estimated the model EXGRADE = α0 +
α1ADJUNCT + α2TESTP + α3LOWER + α4SIZE + α5MEET + α6ECON + α7AGE +
α8MALE + α9EFFORT + α10 HSGPA + α11CRHOURS + α12WORKHRS + V,where
HSGPA represents a students High School grade point average,CRHOURS represents
the number of credit hours taken by the student during the semester and WORKHRS
represents the number of hours worked each week by the student.All other variables
are deﬁned above.We save the estimated error,V,and used the error as an
explanatory variable in the estimation of SET.The second equation estimated is SET =
α0 + α1ADJUNCT + α2TESTP + α3LOWER + α4SIZE + α5MEET + α6ECON + α7AGE +
α8MALE + α9EFFORT + α10 EXGRADE+ α11V + U,where U is the estimated error
term.The instrumental variables used in the ﬁrst equation are HSGPA,CRHOURS,and
WORKHRS.HSGPA was positively related to EXGRADE,and both CRHRS and
WORKHRS were negatively related to EXGRADE.Both the estimated coefficients on
HSGPA and WORKHOURS were signiﬁcant at α <.02.To test for endogeniety,we use
the SET equation,and test Ho:α11 = 0 against the two sided alternative.Based on a t-
value of –1.36,we fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude endogeniety is not
an issue.
3 Initially,we estimated the equation SETi= a + Σ Bi Ci +Σα jTi + Σθ i Di + γ1 Gi +
γ2Gi/GPA + γ3Gi/AVSECTION + γ4Gi/AVCOURSE + γ5 Gi/AVINST + δ1λ + Ei,using all
four different reference grades in the same equation.Although jointly these four
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variables add signiﬁcant explanatory power to the estimation of SET,multicollinearity
between these four explanatory variables resulted in insigniﬁcant ratios for these
variables as well as for the estimated coefficient on expected grade,Gi.
4 The inclusion of explanatory variables in the equations predicting SET that are not
present in the selection equation is unorthodox and may result in inconsistent
estimates.We believe the beneﬁt of including data gathered in the SET process
outweighs the disadvantage caused by the inconsistent estimates
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